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On the critical potential of law – and its limits
Double fragmentation of law in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador
hannah franzki and johan horst
Introduction
The Tribunal hereby orders: the Respondent (whether by its judicial, legisla-
tive or executive branches) to take all measures necessary to suspend or cause
to suspend the enforcement and recognition within and without Ecuador of
the judgment by the Provincial Court Sucumbíos . . . against the First Claim-
ant in the Ecuadorian legal proceedings known as the Lago Agrio Case. . .1
An arbitration award, even though it might be binding for Ecuador, can
neither force judges to violate the human rights guaranteed by the consti-
tution, nor can it expect them to disregard obligations emanating from
international human rights treaties.2
The ﬁrst statement above was issued by an arbitration panel convened
under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to decide a dispute between Chevron Inc. and
the State of Ecuador; the second one is a response, published the
following day, by the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbíos, Ecuador.
Both decisions are pieces of a jigsaw puzzle encompassing several legal
disputes that followed the oil production of Texaco (now Chevron) in the
Ecuadorian rain forest. In February 2011, the Ecuadorian court in
Sucumbíos ordered Chevron to pay $18 billion worth in compensation
to those affected by the environmental pollution and related health
problems, a verdict which was later reduced by the High Court to $9.5
1 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador,
UNCITRAL; PCA Case No. 2009–23 (all further references do documents of this case
with full title and PCA Case No. omitted), Second Interim Award, p. 3.
2 Corte Provincial de Justicia de Sucumbíos, Aguinda y otros v. Chevron, Statement on
Interim Award. p. 3 (our translation).
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billion.3 While the arbitration tribunal claims it has the authority to order
the Ecuadorian government to suspend the sentence, the Ecuadorian
court, in turn, holds that the government is equally bound by national
and international law to protect the human rights of its citizens. To
demand that the government must suspend the judgment would not
only interfere with the judicial independence, but also result in the
violation of the rights of those whose suffering is remedied by the
Ecuadorian judgment.
The interim award in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador is one of many cases in
which arbitration tribunals de facto decide upon the situation of a
population that is not party to the legal dispute. In this chapter, we
discuss the legal disputes emanating from the conﬂict following Texaco’s
oil production as an example of a larger set of cases in which investment
disputes affect the rights of third parties. These cases usually present
themselves as a collision between the rights of those affected by large-
scale investment projects on the one hand, and the rights of investors on
the other. This collision, we will argue, testiﬁes to a double fragmentation
in transnational law, which affects how law frames and decides under-
lying social conﬂicts.
The ﬁrst fragmentation denotes the fragmentation of transnational law
into different legal regimes. Rather than constituting a mere collision
between conﬂicting jurisdictions – understood in the traditional way of
legal competence – the case of Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador should be
understood as the result of this fragmentation. This perspective focuses
on the different logics and rationales underlying the respective legal
regimes: with transnational investment law aiming at offering transac-
tional security and shaped by classical and neoclassical notions of free
trade and movement of capital on a global scale, it institutionalises a very
speciﬁc paradigm of political economy which postulates the free market
and private property as a basis for economic growth and, related hereto,
wealth. While historically human rights law has been closely related to
the institution of private property, it has also served to exempt areas of
society from the rationale of the market (cf. Sonja Buckel’s contribution
in this volume). Thus the collision of human rights law and investment
law is not a mere conﬂict of jurisdictions but a collision of different legal
rationalities. If transnational human rights law is to remedy the negative
consequences of large-scale investment projects, then, to merely include
3 Barrett, ‘Amazon Crusader’.
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it into the legal regime of investment protection – as the dominant
business and human rights approach seems to suggest – would only
make human rights subject to the very logic of investment protection.
Rather, a human rights approach to investment arbitration should
demand a self-restriction of investment law, that is, arbitration panels
should abstain from rendering a decision where rights and interests of
third parties are affected.
The second and more fundamental fragmentation manifest in Chevron
Corp. v. Ecuador concerns the relationship between law and its other, the
non-law. To understand the suffering of the affected population as
human rights violations, or even the idea of the afectados as an actually
existing group, is already a perspective onto the social as construed by
law. In the second part of this chapter we set out to explore this second
fragmentation.
We close this chapter arguing that in the face of the double fragmen-
tation, the emancipatory potential of law in the context of social conﬂict
comes to fruition only if it reﬂects this double fragmentation by what –
evokingWalter Benjamin – could be called a double ‘deposition’ (Entsetzung)
of law. Before we start with the analytical part of the argument, we advance
the central aspects of the legal disputes, which followed the oil drilling
activity in Ecuador, in order to set the scene for the analysis.
Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador: the context
The arbitration dispute under UNCITRAL rules needs to be understood
in the context of a lengthy litigation process that started in 1993. US
lawyer Stephen Dozinger ﬁled a class action lawsuit in the name of a
group of people affected by the oil production of Texaco (the afectados),
demanding damages suffered by the population in the Ecuadorian
Amazon region where Texaco had drilled for oil. He argued that:
As a direct and proximate result of defendant’s breaches of duty, plaintiffs
and the class have suffered injuries to their persons and property. Plain-
tiffs and the class are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive
damages in amounts to be ascertained at trial.4
One year earlier, in 1992, the concession treaty between the Ecuadorian
government and the company had expired, leaving the local population
4 Maria Aguinda et al., v. Texaco Inc., District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Complaint of 3 November 1993, p. 29.
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with the remainders of thirty years of oil exploitation – open pits, oil
spillages, and health damage. The responsibility of Texaco (which was
bought in 2001 by Chevron Corp.) for health and environmental dam-
ages is, by now, subject to a range of legal disputes all of which are linked
to the class action suit ﬁled in 1993. In 2002, nine years after the suit was
ﬁrst presented, the federal court in New York dismissed its jurisdiction
on the grounds of a forum non conveniens rationale, arguing that the
claim should be brought before an Ecuadorian court, as long as both
parties would subject themselves to Ecuadorian jurisdiction. The claim-
ants thus ﬁled a lawsuit with the Court in Lago Agrio (Province of
Sucumbíos), which issued a judgment in 2011, obliging Chevron to pay
around $10 billion in reparations and compensation.5 Legal grounds
for the claim were, in addition to Ecuadorian tort law and Article 15 of
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 169, the
Ecuadorian constitution. The latter grants the collective right to a clean
and healthy environment, the violation of which enables citizens to ﬁle
a legal complaint. Furthermore, the bill on environmental management,
adopted in 1999, allows any citizen to denounce a breach of its regula-
tions. Thus, one central and contested aspect of the Lago Agrio trial was
the degree of the environmental and health damage produced by the oil
production. Over the course of the proceedings, more than hundred,
often mutually contradicting, expert reports were produced. By the time
the judgment was handed down, Chevron had already withdrawn its
assets from Ecuadorian soil so that the claimants now seek to enforce the
judgment abroad.6
Chevron, for its part, embarked on two different legal strategies to ﬁght
the decision made by the Ecuadorian court.7 Based on the ‘Racketeer
Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO-Act)’, they ﬁled a
claim against the lawyers of the afectados in the United States, arguing
that the lawyers had conspired to win the claim in Ecuador through
illegal practices. In the decision published in March 2014, Judge Kaplan
ordered an injunction after ﬁnding that the ‘decision in the Lago Agrio
5 Judgment No. 2011-0106, Sala Única de la Corte Provincial de Sucumbios, 3 January 2012
(Spanish). The judgment was approved by the Court of Appeals; see judgment of the Corte
Nacional de Justicia, Aguinda, 12 November 2013.
6 Lawyers for the plaintiffs have sought to enforce the judgment in Brazil, Argentina and
Canada, so far without success. For the latest developments see Noronha, ‘Ecuadorian
Chevron Oil Pollution Case’.
7 See for an overview of the different legal proceedings: Dhooge, ‘Aguinda v. Chevron
Texaco’.
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case was obtained by corrupt means’ and that ‘defendants here may not
be allowed to beneﬁt from that in any way’.8 In addition, even before the
Ecuadorian court had published its decision, Chevron initiated (in 2009)
a UNCITRAL arbitration proceeding against Ecuador with the aim to
prevent courts from enforcing the Ecuadorian judgment.9 The decision
in the Lago Agrio case, they argued, violates the rights protected by the
bilateral investment treaty between Ecuador and the United States from
1993.10 In a nutshell, Chevron held that in 1995, Texaco and Ecuador
had signed a settlement agreement that released Texaco (and hence now
Chevron) from any further claims regarding the environmental pollution
caused in Ecuador. By now, the arbitration tribunal has published ﬁve
decisions and interim measures according to Article 26 (1) UNCITRAL
rules,11 namely four Interim Awards12 and one Partial Award.13 In its
ﬁrst Interim Award on Interim Measures, published on 25 January 2013,
the tribunal ordered Ecuador to impede the enforcement of the Lago
Agrio Judgment in Ecuador. Once the plaintiffs sought to enforce the
judgment abroad, the tribunal extended the order so that Ecuador should
also impede the enforcement in other countries.14 The political and legal
tensions arising from this decision are at the core of this chapter.
Beyond jurisdiction
Plaintiffs, lawyers andmany commentators have celebrated the judgment in
the Lago Agrio case as successful precedent to hold companies legally
accountable for the negative consequences of their operations.15 With the
pending arbitration proceedings, however, there seems to be the possibility
that the panel will decide in favour of Chevron and oblige the Ecuadorian
government to prevent the judgment from being enforced. The interim
8 United States District Court Southern District of New York, Chevron Corp. v. Stephen
Donziger, et al., 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), Opinion, 4 March 2014, p. 484.
9 For a general overview over the various litigations, see Dhooge, ‘Aguinda v. Chevron
Texaco’.
10 Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of Investment.
11 On Article. 26 UNCITRAL Rules cf. Caron and Caplan, The UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, chapter 17.
12 Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures, 7 February 2013.
13 First Partial Award on Track, 17 September 2013.
14 Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, 16 February 2012; Fourth Interim Award on
Interim Measures, 7 February 2013, No. 80.
15 E.g., Vogt, ‘Urteil Ecuador vs. Chevron’.
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awards and the ﬁrst partial award issued so far raise several questions. As
indicated earlier, the arbitration panel establishes its own jurisdiction
assuming the authority to oblige Ecuador to suspend the local court’s
judgment. Such a judgment would effectively leave the afectados without
remedies.
The arbitration tribunal, however, avoids dealing with this contradic-
tion in that it excludes the afectados from its jurisdiction. As a result, the
fact that the Lago Agrio case and the arbitration proceedings both deal
with the same problem while demanding different actions is not per-
ceived as a legal problem for the arbitrators. A close look at the awards
reveals the legal reasoning that enables this move. In its submission to the
arbitration panel, the Ecuadorian government had pointed out the legal
conﬂicts that would emerge if it were to be obliged to suspend the Lago
Agrio judgment. It put forward two central arguments to counter Chev-
ron’s demand. First, it argued that if it had to suspend the judgment it
would violate the procedural rights of the afectados that are granted by
international human rights treaties and the Ecuadorian constitution. It
demanded that the UNCITRAL tribunal consider the rights of the
afectados by acknowledging that Ecuador had to comply with inter-
national human rights treaties.16 The second argument put forward by
Ecuador is based on the Monetary Gold17 principle, according to which a
court has no jurisdiction where the decision necessarily concerns third
parties that are not part to the proceedings before it.18 This principle
has also been applied in investment disputes. Hence, Ecuador held that
any decision made by the arbitration panel effectively affected the rights
of the afectados, which meant that the UNCITRAL tribunal lacked
jurisdiction.19
As indicated above, the arbitration panel did not follow the Ecuador-
ian submission but ordered ‘the Respondent to take all measures at its
disposal to suspend or cause to suspend the enforcement or recognition
within and without Ecuador of any judgment against the First Claimant in
the Lago Agrio Case’.20 The legal foundations for the tribunal’s position
16 Track 2 Counter-Memorial on the Merits of the Republic of Ecuador, 18 February 2013,
No. 486ff. and No. 493ff.
17 Ibid., No. 515ff. 18 ICJ Rep. 1954, 19.
19 Track 2 Counter-Memorial on the Merits of the Republic of Ecuador, 18 February 2013,
No. 525.
20 First Interim Award on InterimMeasures, 25 January 2012. This decision was re-afﬁrmed in
the 2nd and 4th interim awards, see Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, 16 Febru-
ary 2012, and Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures, 7 February 2013, No. 80
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‘that it has jurisdiction to proceed to the merits phase of these arbitration
proceedings’21 are spelled out in the third interim award.22 In relation to the
Monetary Gold principle referred to by the Ecuadorian government, the
arbitrators distinguished several dimensions, two of which are of import-
ance in the context of this chapter.23 For one, it afﬁrmed the principle of
consent according towhich a tribunal did only have jurisdiction over a party
insofar as it had subjected itself to it. Consequently, it found that in the
present case, the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the afectados.
Second, the tribunal agreed that it would not have jurisdiction if its decision
affected an ‘indispensable third party’. However, in its view, the afectados
did not constitute an ‘indispensable third party’ to the dispute dealt with by
the tribunal.24 This is because it had to decide on the rights and obligations
emanating from the bilateral investment treaty in general, and in particular
whether the 1995 Settlement Agreement betweenTexaco and Ecuador freed
Chevron from any further obligations regarding the damages produced by
the oil drilling.25 While the panel recognised that the arbitration award
might indeed affect the rights of the afectados, it maintained that this tension
would have to be dealt with by the Ecuadorian government and was not a
responsibility of the tribunal.26 The tribunal concludes:
The question for this Tribunal is in essence whether the Respondent has
or has not violated rights of the Claimants under the BIT because of the
way in which the Respondent has, through its organs, acted in relation to
the settlement agreements. The question is one of the rights and obliga-
tions existing between the Claimants and the Respondent; and the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs, who are not parties to the settlement agreement or to the
BIT, do not have rights that are directly engaged by that question. If it
should transpire that the Respondent has, by concluding the Release
Agreements, taken a step which had the legal effect of depriving the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs of rights under Ecuadorian Law that they might otherwise
have enjoyed, that would be a matter between them and the Respondent,
and not a matter for this Tribunal.27
21 Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 27 February 2012, 5.2.
22 While in the third interim award the Tribunal applies a prima facie standard that means
that the decision is not ﬁnal, the Tribunal in its ﬁrst partial award has afﬁrmed the latter.
On the prima facie principle, cf. Third Interim Award 4.3ff., on the incorporation of the
third interim award in the ﬁrst partial award see UNCITRAL, Chevron v. The Republic of
Ecuador, 17 December 2013, No. 2.
23 See Third Interim Award 4.59ff. 24 See Third Interim Award 4.65.
25 See Track 2 Counter-Memorial on the Merits of the Republic of Ecuador, 18 February
2013, No. 323ff.
26 Third Interim Award 4.67. 27 Third Interim Award 4.70.
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This close look at the doctrinal reasoning of the tribunal allows us to
reﬁne our understanding of the way in which the collision presents itself.
Rather than colliding interests within one legal regime – that is between
rights of the afectados on the one hand and the rights of the investors
on the other – the de facto collision of interests is legally resolved by
ignoring what the respective legal regimes ﬁnd to be beyond their
jurisdiction. There is no conﬂict of interest as far as the rationale of the
arbitration tribunal goes, because it does not have jurisdiction over the
afectados. As a consequence, the rights and interests of the afectados
are expelled from the arbitration proceedings. At the same time, the
Ecuadorian court afﬁrms its jurisdiction over the claims of the afectados.
At present, there is no legal norm or institution that could decide these
competing jurisdictional claims. Rather, each legal forum decides on the
scope of its own jurisdiction. What we can observe then is a multipolar
conﬂict of jurisdictions within a heterarchical order.
However, while legally there is no hierarchy between these jurisdictions,
they are of course embedded within the relationship of forces that char-
acterise the present world order. This is especially true for transnational
investment law. Especially post-colonial approaches to international law
have pointed out that the legal protection of foreign investment has
developed in the context of decolonisation and served primarily the
interest of capital exporting countries.28 In this vein, Kate Miles reminds
us that
it is of fundamental importance to the shape and character of international
investment law that the context in which its principles were developed was
one of exploitation and imperialism. The rules evolved so as to advance the
interests of Western capital-exporting states engaging with the non-
European world, and, as such, they protected only the investor.29
Furthermore, contributions from the ﬁeld of (heterodox) international
political economy have pointed out that the sedimentation of neoliberal
principles in transnational investment law restricts the policy options
that can be adopted within nation states.30 Against this backdrop, we
28 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, pp. 196ff.; Pahuja,
Decolonising International Law, pp. 95ff.
29 Miles, ‘International Investment Law’, p. 10.
30 See Gill, ‘Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations’, pp. 60–1;
Schneiderman, ‘Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism’, pp. 757ff.; Schneider-
man, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization; Möller, ‘Global Assemblages im neuen
Konstitutionalismus’, pp. 48–9.
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have to contextualise jurisdictional conﬂicts within competing (global-
ised) economic and political projects.
Jurisdiction otherwise or the problem of double fragmentation
Practitioners and academics have tried to address this problem of con-
ﬂicting jurisdictions under the heading of ‘human rights approaches to
investment’.31 This debate explores doctrinal arguments to consider rights
of third parties within investment law.32 Despite their differences, these
proposals essentially attempt to remedy the jurisdictional conﬂict between
arbitration panels and other adjudicatory bodies by developing doctrinal
arguments that require arbitration tribunals to take into account the rights
of third parties. Inter alia, they point out that according to Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arbitration panels have to
consider human rights while interpreting investment treaties33 or they
propose that investment tribunals consider human rights of third parties
as part of a balancing or proportionality test.34 Such proposals are not
without merit. However, as we already alluded to in the previous section,
the tribunal’s jurisdictional considerations in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador
also point to a collision that is much more fundamental than a conﬂict
of jurisdictions.
First fragmentation: investment law versus human rights law
Traditional jurisdictional thought presents jurisdiction as something that
follows from an authority established otherwise (in the present case, the
arbitration tribunal claims that its authority is based on the consent of
the parties). Within this theoretical framework, conﬂict, territory and
subjects are already there when the law enters the stage. From the
margins of jurisdictional thought, however, we are reminded that juris-
diction ‘refers ﬁrst and foremost to the power and authority to speak in
31 Inter alia: Reiner and Schreuer, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Arbitra-
tion’, pp. 83–4; Simma and Kill, ‘Harmonizing Investment Protection and International
Human Rights’, pp. 695ff.; Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration’, pp. 584ff.; Davitti,
‘On the Meanings of International Investment Law and International Human Rights
Law’; Krommendijk and Morijn, ‘“Proportional” by What Measure(s)?’.
32 See Petersmann, ‘International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice’.
33 Simma and Kill, ‘Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights’,
pp. 695ff.
34 Krommendijk and Morijn, ‘“Proportional” by What Measure(s)?’.
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the name of law’.35 From such a perspective, jurisdiction refers to a
double movement of creating and re-afﬁrming authority.36 ‘At the juris-
dictional threshold’, Bradin Cormack writes, ‘the law speaks to itself,
and in a mirror reproduces as administration the juridical order that it
simultaneously produces’.37 To think about jurisdiction as a ‘ﬁrst ques-
tion of law’,38 that is as a problem of authorisation of legal worlds and
not merely as a technical question of competence, enables us to per-
ceive ‘how rival forms and accounts of political authority and ways of
belonging to law are enacted and performed over the same people and
the same places at the same time’.39 From this perspective, it becomes
necessary to revise the doctrinal approaches mentioned above as they fail
to account for the fact that the collision at stake involves fundamentally
different ways of ‘belonging to law’. For the jurisdictional conﬂict is only
the epiphenomenon of a more fundamental collision of different legal
regimes, each of which reproduces (in the sense of both to repeat and to
produce) the speciﬁc logic of a functional system. Only at a ﬁrst glance
does the jurisdictional conﬂict take place between an international body
(the arbitration tribunal) and a national court – deﬁned by territorial
parameters. The jurisdiction of international investment law constitutes
the juridiﬁcation of a particular global economic order. It serves the
protection of foreign direct investment. To guarantee transaction security
by means of legal protection, the story goes, is necessary in order to
attract foreign investment, which in turn is required to secure economic
prosperity. Transnational investment law thus reproduces a particular
economic logic, which has informed wide areas of global economic law.
This insight on the relationship between economic law and a particular
transnational economic order is by no means original and has been the
subject of a number of investigations. In a similar vein, the very basic
assumptions on which this economic order is grounded (free trade as
means to archive global economic wealth) have been contradicted on an
empirical as well as theoretical level.40
35 Rush, ‘An Altered Jurisdiction’, p. 150.
36 Matthews, ‘From Jurisdiction to Juriswriting’, pp. 4–5.
37 Cormack, A Power to Do Justice, p. 9.
38 Matthews, ‘From Jurisdiction to Juriswriting’, p. 3.
39 Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter’, p. 71.
40 Recently the UNCTAD found for example that ‘BITs appear to have no effect on bilateral
North-South FDI ﬂows’: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2014 (UNCTAD/
TDR/2014), 159. That means that it is rather doubtful whether the signing of Bilateral
Investment Treaties has a positive economic effect for so-called developing countries.
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The UNCITRAL panel operates within the parameters of this particu-
lar economic rationale – the protection of private property, fostering
economic development through foreign investment, the maximisation of
proﬁt. Accordingly, if it is confronted with the claim that the afectados
have rights to be protected from the impact of foreign investment, it is
confronted with a completely different logic. Any attempt to protect the
rights of those affected by foreign investment by means of transnational
investment arbitration merely subjects them to the economic rationale
that shaped the regime of investment law. They would become mere
receivers of law (rights) within a jurisdiction that produces/authorises a
world that is centred around the principle of private property and
expected proﬁt. The investment arbitration tribunal construes the prob-
lem at stake according to its own logic so that other jurisdictional claims
are not even perceived. This is epitomised by the following statement:
. . . from its perspective under international law, this Tribunal is the only
tribunal with the power to restrain the Respondent [Ecuador, the authors]
generally from aggravating the Parties’ dispute and causing irreparable
harm to the Claimants [Chevron Corp., the authors] in regard to the
enforcement and execution of the Lago Agrio Judgment.41
From the perspective of investment law, the rights of those affected by
investment projects constitute an obstacle or threat to the smooth func-
tioning of the regimes logic. Human rights of third parties can enter
investment treaty arbitration only in the form of a disturbing exception
to the rule of investment protection. To address the regime collision by
expanding the jurisdiction of the investment arbitration panel over the
rights of affected third parties therefore means to frame the conﬂict in a
very speciﬁc way: human rights of third parties are only acknowledged
within the narrow boundaries of a very speciﬁc regime logic. Against this
background the call for consideration of human rights in investment
treaty arbitration, intended to mitigate the negative effects of investment
arbitration proceedings, in fact expands the reach of this regime’s logic.42
A human rights approach to investment has to take into account that
considering rights of third parties within the framework of investment
treaty arbitration is not a neutral process. First, investment arbitration
panels are not ﬁt to balance human rights with rights of investors because
41 Fourth Interim Award, No. 82.
42 See for a similar argument with respect to the lack of transparency and legitimacy of
investment arbitration proceedings: Reiner and Schreuer, ‘Human Rights and Inter-
national Investment Arbitration’.
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they consider human rights only within the speciﬁc and narrow eco-
nomic rationale of a neoclassical free trade agenda. Second, the delimi-
tation of jurisdiction is also an expression of power asymmetries between
the different legal regimes of world law. Thus, including human rights of
third parties into investment arbitration proceedings may not lead to a
consolidation of those rights in conﬂicts with investor rights. It would
rather mean that a structurally biased adjudicatory body would decide
over rights of persons, who have never agreed to such panels and who
have no standing in front of them.
A human rights approach to investment arbitration should therefore
not demand that arbitration panels consider human rights of third parties
as part of their jurisdiction. Instead, the demand should be primarily that
arbitration panels abstain from rendering a decision where rights and
interests of third parties are affected. This self-restrictive determination
of its own jurisdiction would leave it to other forums of world law to
deal with the underlying conﬂicts according to a logic not serving merely
the logic of capital. We will discuss this suggestion in more detail in the
last section of this chapter. Before doing so, we will turn to what we call
the second fragmentation of law which becomes manifest in Chevron
Corp. v. Ecuador.
Second fragmentation: the collision between law and non-law
The intuitive answer to this analysis would be to call upon a different legal
regime, such as human rights law or environmental law, to deal with the
conﬂict. While these regimes indeed embody a different social logic than
investment law, they are not without their own problems. The process of
translating a social conﬂict into the legal language has its own costs, even
for those for whom the protective umbrella of human rights is meant. In
addition to the ﬁrst fragmentation, which concerns the fragmentation of
law into different legal regimes, we can identify a second fragmentation
affecting the relationship of law to its other, to that which is non-law.43
As with the ﬁrst fragmentation, we take the notion of a second frag-
mentation of law from Gunter Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano.
The second fragmentation of law refers to collisions between modern law
and normative concerns emerging from indigenous cultures.44 From the
perspective of systems theory, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano summarise
43 For an in-depth discussion of this relationship see Menke in this volume.
44 Teubner and Korth, ‘Zwei Arten des Rechtspluralismus’.
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the problems arising from strategic litigation with the aim of protecting
indigenous knowledge as follows: ‘The real problem behind these litiga-
tion strategies lies in their issue framing. What are the categories in which
politics and law in the centres of modernity perceive the problem of
traditional knowledge in peripheral societies?’45 Still, if the aim is to put
limits to the economic exploitation of indigenous knowledge, it is neces-
sary to translate non-legal categories and needs into the language of law.46
The legal ﬁction of indigenous ‘customary law’ is one example, we hold,
for how this can be done. Here, the so-called modern law, transforms
‘communication from a local culture’ into ‘formal legal acts’, that is, it
construes non-law as law. Only through this movement, law perceives the
non-law as law and thus can limit itself in a way that leaves space for non-
legal communications. Against this backdrop the authors conclude:
The attempt at understanding how these people see themselves appears to
be the only promising chance, in order to reconstruct this understanding
as restrictions in the respective language of the fragmented systems. The
way in which the producers of traditional knowledge perceive them-
selves – ‘the principle of indigenous self-determination’ – should be the
normative center of gravitation.47
However, in conceptualising the second fragmentation, Fischer-Lescano
and Teubner still need to assume that ‘indigenous knowledge’ exists
before and outside modern law. They thus seem to essentialise to a
certain extent indigenous identity. This is, however, problematic for
several reasons. Most importantly, this notion of indigenous knowledge
does not reﬂect the fact that what they describe as regional and trad-
itional cultures is already the result of a colonial encounter; it is already
a description made by ‘modern law’.48 In order to reﬂect this fact, it is
necessary to take the idea of double fragmentation one step further. It
is the self-characterisation of modern law as modern and functionally
differentiated law that construes that which is non-modern and non-
functionally differentiated as its other. Modern law thus produces its
other in its self-characterisation. The dichotomy between modern law
45 Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, ‘Cannibalizing Epistemes’, p. 19. 46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 31.
48 Nelken formulates a similar critique with reference to Teubner’s notion of autopoiesis:
‘All this suggests that there may be some danger of autopoietic theory being insufﬁciently
reﬂexive about the extent to which its ideas about legal culture are shaped by the legal
culture in which it was created’, see Nelken, ‘Beyond the Metaphor of Legal Transplants?’,
pp. 289–90.
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and indigenous cultures is the result of modern law’s self-characterisation.
The non-law is conceived as something that can be translated, captured in
law, but not as something that challenges the logic of law itself. This
becomes evident also in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador.
So far, we have been writing as if the afectados were a group of
individuals that existed outside the law or before the law, protected by
human rights law and which had experienced violations of their rights.
However, the very entity of afectados is a legal artefact produced by a
different jurisdiction – the jurisdiction of social, economic, cultural and
environmental rights. Continuing to think jurisdiction in relation to
political authority (or legal regimes in relation to differentiated functional
systems), the jurisdiction of social, economic and cultural, as well as
environmental rights evokes different values or logics than investment
law. Here, the basic needs of the individual (or of a group) constitute the
basic principle of the world or authority that is invoked. Against this
backdrop, the call for human rights might indeed challenge the neo-liberal
logic of transnational investment law. To state that the afectados have
suffered damages and human rights violations (as is done in the Lago
Agrio proceedings) authorises a different order or world, a different logic
of what is considered important. Still, the human rights regime knows
the afectados only as receivers of law. The human rights regime gives
rights to the afectados, who are perceived as some non-legal reality. What
is omitted is the fact that the afectados as a group exist only through law.
To frame the (legal, political, economic) conﬂict in terms of human rights
violations introduces a particular form of representation in which actors
‘have rights and culture’,49 but no jurisdiction, that is, no competing
authority that would question the human rights language. In this vein,
the worldview of the indigenous population that inhabit the territory
where the oil drilling took place becomes a cultural good, to be protected
by law, but not able to create law itself.
This becomes manifest when the indigenous populations in the affected
area are reduced to their ‘culture’ to bring them under the protective
umbrella of rights. Whenever Ecuador invokes the rights of the afectados
in the UNCITRAL proceedings, it portrays the group in a speciﬁc way:
the life of the indigenous populations in the area before arrival of the
oil companies is described as one led ‘in harmony’50 with the rainforest
49 Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter’, p. 71.
50 Track 2 Counter-Memorial on the Merits of the Republic of Ecuador, 18 February 2013,
No. 26. (‘Before TexPet began its oil activity in the Oriente (East) region of the
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and its natural resources. To quote but one example from the Counter
Memorial submitted by Ecuador:
Before TexPet began its oil activity in the Oriente (East) region of the
Ecuadorian Amazon, at least eight groups of indigenous peoples lived
there in harmony with the rainforest . . . Ecuador’s indigenous peoples
relied on the rainforest for their subsistence through hunting, gathering,
and practicing sustainable agriculture. The streams, rivers, and lakes of
the rainforest also were inextricably linked with their daily lives because
they relied on its waters, groundwater, ﬂora, and fauna for ﬁshing,
bathing, cooking, drinking, washing clothes, and transportation. In add-
ition to nutritional and domestic purposes, indigenous peoples used the
rainforest’s elements in the preparation of traditional medicine. Sustain-
able agriculture, called ‘chacra’ or ‘swidden agriculture,’ also contributed
to indigenous groups’ ability to survive in low-density populations in the
rainforest. . . Experts praise the indigenous peoples’ eco-friendly system as
a ‘truly sustainable agriculture that is environmentally sound’.51
However, rather than actually existing before modern law, the identiﬁca-
tion with a particular worldview that requires protection is only pro-
duced as the ‘other’ of modernity and modern law. The ecological way of
life as characteristic of the inhabitants of the Amazon is the result of their
contact with the colonial population:
What are seen (and they themselves see) today as their traditions, customs
and economies are indeed the sedimentation of resistances, survival
strategies and adaptive response in the face of mass destruction of their
ancestral communal life by modern conquerors and setters of all
denominations.52
In a similar vein, Bardomiano Hernandez describes the fetishisation of
their own culture as a reaction of the affected groups to the threat to their
existence.53 What Sergio Costa und Guilherme Leite Gonçalves write
regarding the protection of afro-descendants holds true for the present
context as well: the protection of indigenous groups by multicultural
Ecuadorian Amazon, at least eight groups of indigenous peoples lived there in harmony
with the rainforest’.).
51 Track 2 Counter-Memorial on the Merits of the Republic of Ecuador, 18 February 2013,
No. 28, pp. 14ff.
52 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense, p. 238. For the Ecuadorian case see further
Rivas and Lara, Conservación y Petróleo, and Davidov, ‘Aguinda v. Texaco Inc.’.
53 Hernández, ‘Cowode’.
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rights result in the construction of ‘a monolithic identity deﬁned by
ancestral traits, which are treated as if they were completely immune
and refractory to divisions, internal conﬂicts and interactions and ties
with the surrounding society’.54 While group rights are necessary, they
need to reﬂect that ‘. . . any intervention of the . . . law redraws the map of
the identity negotiations, intervening in the constitution of the socio-
cultural groups’.55 Hence, the ‘cultural characteristics’ attributed to the
affected population is not a ‘reality’ translated into the language of law,
but the result of a legal strategy.
In her much discussed essay, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’, Gayatri Spivak
reminds us that in every act of representation there is an aesthetic
dimension. To represent denotes both speaking for someone, but also
providing an image of something or someone. Whenever I speak for a
group I also speak about a group and thereby construe a ‘transparent’
subject as if it actually existed.56 Spivak’s warning about the structures of
power and representation proper to academia is also relevant for the
analysis of human rights litigation, something she explores in more depth
in a lecture held as part of the Oxford Amnesty Lectures, later published
under the title ‘Righting Wrongs’. She starts her text with a discussion
of the language of ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’. We can have rights and claim
their protection, but wrongs can only be experienced. In order to be able
to speak about wrongs, it is always necessary to speak of someone or
something else that has produced the damage. Indeed, she observes,
‘wrong’ is usually used as a verb – to wrong. In relation to ‘Human
Wrongs’ the notion of ‘Human Rights’ also acquires an active dimension.
‘Thus’, she concludes, ‘Human Rights is not only about having or
claiming a right or a set of rights; it is also about righting wrongs, about
being the dispenser of these rights’.57 Spivak refers to a divide that is
inscribed into the idea of human rights. In so far as they demand that
injustices should be remedied, the grammar of human rights implies a
‘friendly social-Darwinist agenda’ according to which the ﬁtter popula-
tion has become active in favour of those who have been wronged but
who cannot speak for themselves:58 ‘The work of righting wrongs is
shared above a class line that to some extent and unevenly cuts across
race and the North-South divide’.59 The relevance of this comment for
54 Costa and Gonçalves, ‘Human Rights as Collective Entitlement?’, p. 68.
55 Ibid., p. 69. 56 Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, p. 271, pp. 276–7.
57 Spivak, ‘Righting Wrongs’, pp. 523ff. 58 Ibid., pp. 524–5. 59 Ibid., pp. 525–6.
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the present case is probably most obvious with regards to the dispute
about the legal representation of the Huoarani people once it became
public that Steven Donzinger had sold shares of the legal claim without
the knowledge of the plaintiffs.60
The juridiﬁcation of a conﬂict, that is its translation into a quaestio
iuris even in the form of subjective rights, produces its own relationships
of power – in the form of personal representation as well as the re-
presentation of the social conﬂict at stake. It requires those engaging with
the law to deﬁne themselves as legal subjects and frame their needs and
interests in a way they become understandable in legal terms. In this
context, it is worth noting that in Ecuador this form of identity politics
around single issues (in this case environmental pollution) has been
replacing broader struggles that questioned the development-oriented
state politics or demanded redistribution since the 1990s.61 A tendency
which needs to be understood within what Nancy Fraser has called the
post-socialist condition:
an absence of any credible overarching emancipatory project despite the
proliferation of fronts of struggle; a general decoupling of the cultural
politics of recognition from the social politics of redistribution; and a
decentering of claims for equality in the face of aggressive marketization
and sharply rising material ’inequality.62
The legalisation of the situation as a conﬂict between the afectados
and Chevron Corp. is the result of a selective construction of the non-
law by law. In this process, a difference between the indigenous popu-
lation and modern law is created in which the indigenous population is
not perceived as a conﬂicting jurisdiction – capable of producing its
own law – but as mere receiver of rights within the structure of a
national state. If we draw on social, economic, and cultural rights to
counter the neo-liberal jurisdiction of investment law, we have to take
into account this violent relationship between law and what it construes
as its other.
60 Chevron v. Donziger, Proposed Intervenors’ Memorandum of Law in support of Motion
to Intervene; Huaio v. Donziger.
61 See the contributions in Pineda and Krainer (eds.), Periferias de la periferia; see also
Lembke, In the Land of Oligarchs; Korovkin, ‘Between Class and Ethnicity’, pp. 331–4.
62 Fraser, Justice Interruptus, pp. 3–4, see also Torpey, who states: ‘The decline of utopian
politics has combined with identity politics to produce “reparations politics”’; Torpey,
‘An Avalanche of History’, pp. 28–9.
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From double fragmentation to the double Entsetzung of law
What, then, remains after the analysis carried out thus far? To repeat:
with respect to the ﬁrst fragmentation of law, we have come to the
conclusion that the collision of different legal regimes of world law
cannot be solved within investment treaty arbitration proceedings. For
this would simply expand the reach of the investment regime. Mitigating
conﬂicts between investor rights and human rights of third parties
therefore requires that investment tribunals exercise their jurisdiction
with self-restraint, when human rights of third parties are affected. The
problem of the second fragmentation, that is, the confrontation of the
so-called modern law with so-called regional cultures, is that modern law
applies the logic of a functionally differentiated law to non-functionally
differentiated sectors of society. The double fragmentation of law thus
raises the question whether law can have an emancipatory potential63 at
all for the conﬂicts displayed in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador. Against this
background it seems as if law has nothing to offer for an emancipatory
critique of the underlying conﬂicts of the case. However, an emancipa-
tory critique of law cannot consist in negating or suspending the law.64
For the suspension of law would deprive the afectados of any chance to
receive justice. An emancipatory critique would instead require an enact-
ment of law that does justice to its double fragmentation. Drawing on
Walter Benjamin’s concept of the Entsetzung of law65, and Christoph
Menke’s studies on law and violence66 and law and form,67 we propose
that a double Entsetzung of the law would allow for an emancipatory
enactment of law.
In his essay ‘Critique of Violence’, Benjamin writes:
On the breaking of this cycle maintained by mythical forms of law, on the
suspension [Entsetzung] of law with all the forces on which it depends as
they depend on it, ﬁnally therefore on the abolition of state power, a new
historical epoch is founded.68
As Menke points out, the notion of ‘Entsetzung’ goes beyond the English
translation of suspension.69
63 See Fischer-Lescano, ‘Systemtheorie als kritische Gesellschaftstheorie’.
64 Menke, ‘Law and Violence’; Menke, Recht und Gewalt, p. 63.
65 Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’.
66 Menke, ‘Law and Violence’; Menke, Recht und Gewalt. 67 Menke in this volume.
68 Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 300. 69 Menke, ‘Law and Violence’, p. 13.
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The German term Entsetzung has a double meaning . . . For Entsetzung
means both to depose someone from an ofﬁce or honour and to lift the
military occupation of a town or fortress. Entsetzung of law thus means
that it is deposed from the ofﬁce it currently occupies, and at the same
time released from a power besieging it.70
Thus, for Menke, the Entsetzung of law does not mean to abolish the
law,71 but deposing and liberating it from its inherent violence.72 This
however would require a different way of enacting the law. Such an
enactment of the law would require, according to Menke, a law that
becomes self-reﬂective. A self-reﬂective enactment of law would reiterate
internally the distinction between law and non-law and would be con-
stantly reminded of the fact that that the law itself originates in its
distinction from non-law.73 Thus, the Entsetzung of law as deposing
and liberating the law from its inherent violence requires a self-reﬂective
enactment of law. When we relate this formal determination of law as a
self-reﬂective enactment, to our analysis of the underlying conﬂicts of
Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, we can identify two different forms or instan-
tiations of an Entsetzung of law representing the two fragmentations
of law.
The Entsetzung of law I
As indicated above, investment law enacts the law according to the
requirements of its speciﬁc internal rationality. It suppresses the interests
of the afectados and thereby enforces en passant certain hegemonic
interests against societal resistance. The ﬁrst deposition (Entsetzung) of
law would here consist in a self-reﬂective enactment of investment law
according to which investment law would experience its rationality as
one among several and potentially equally legitimate rationalities within
world law. This would confront an investment panel internally with the
question whether it is the legal regime of investment law that should be
the judge of the societal conﬂict at hand or whether it should abstain
70 Menke, ‘Law and Violence’, p. 13 (footnotes omitted, italics in the original).
71 Menke, Recht und Gewalt, p. 63. 72 Menke, ‘Law and Violence’, p. 13.
73 This is a rough translation of this passage: ‘Die Selbstreﬂexion des Rechts besteht darin,
die Entgegensetzung des Rechts zum Nichtrechtlichen, durch die sich das Recht hervor-
bringt, im Recht zu wiederholen; das selbstreﬂexive Recht „weiß”– was das nicht
selbstreﬂexive . . . Recht beständig vergisst –, dass es selbst durch seine Unterscheidung
das Nichtrechtliche, gegen das es sich durchsetzen muss, erst hervorgebracht hat’. Menke,
Recht und Gewalt, p. 69.
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from judging. The self-reﬂective enactment of law therefore opens up
the option to abstain from judging; that is, to depose itself from its legal
authority over the societal conﬂict. Considering human rights then does
not mean to decide a case within the framework of investment law, but
rather setting the case free from investment law’s rationality. But reﬂect-
ing on its inherent rationality also bears the potential of an investment
law that wants to be different, an investment law that internally opposes
its own rationality.74 For a self-reﬂective enacting of investment law
would also confront investment law internally with its colonial past
and its hegemonic position within world law. An enactment of invest-
ment law in the face of its inherent violence can thereby develop what
Menke calls, with reference to Adorno, distaste against itself.75 Such
distaste renders possible internal opposition and internal politicisation
of investment law. Without societal pressure, however, such a distaste
may not be developed or be without consequences. Never the less, it
would serve as a reminder that investment laws’ rationality, its design
and principles, are not set in stone. A self-reﬂective inner distaste con-
stantly challenges the current status of investment law and demands a
different investment law, an investment law to come.76 This would be a
law that does not serve only to protect investor’s rights, but an invest-
ment law that would understand the needs of the local population, of
environmental protection, of societal interests as realisation of the ration-
ality of investment protection itself.77 Thus, with reference to the ﬁrst
fragmentation of law in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador the Entsetzung of
investment law would consist in a self-reﬂective enacting of the law
according to which investment law abstains from judging, freeing itself
from authority over a societal conﬂict.
The Entsetzung of law II
Parallel to the ﬁrst fragmentation of law, which demands a reﬂection on
the relationship between different legal regimes, the second fragmenta-
tion requires a reﬂection of law’s relationship to the non-law. Here, the
suspension of law would consist in an inner legal reﬂection of law’s
74 See for the notion of self-opposition of law: Fischer-Lescano, Rechtskraft.
75 See Menke, Recht und Gewalt, pp. 102–3.
76 This concept of the ‘law to come’ draws on Derrida, Rogues.
77 See, for a related concept with reference to the market for OTC Derivatives: Horst,
‘Politiken der Entparadoxierung’, pp. 193ff.
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relationship to non-law. If representing those affected by investment
arbitration in the form of subjects’ human rights seems to be the only
way of recognising them in law at all, to simply abolish human rights
doesn’t seem to offer any emancipatory way out of the dilemma.78 We
suggested above that, as a strategic decision, translating a social conﬂict
into the quaestio iuris79 can help articulating counter-hegemonic inter-
ests. The task for an emancipatory legal practise would be to enact the
law in a way that reﬂects the process of juridiﬁcation itself, that is the
construction of something as non-law in the course of the legal process.
To paraphrase Christoph Menke, law never refers to events or actors in
the ‘real world’, but only to their legalised representations.80
The self-reﬂection of law we propose here would uncover that, in
enacting the law, the ascriptions necessary for the legalisation of societal
conﬂicts are made by law itself. This would also mean that law realises
that the very distinction between law and non-law is generated only in the
process of generating the law. Such a self-reﬂective enactment of law,
however, does not overturn the ﬁssure between law and non-law. There is
no immediate reconciliation of law and life.81 Again, what a self-reﬂective
enactment of law offers is a law where the legal ascriptions and the
juridiﬁcation of social conﬂicts as well as the distinction between law
and non-law are made visible, and thus can be contested, challenged and
opposed. When law’s authority over non-law depoliticises a social conﬂict
in that it frames it as merely a legal question (and not as a problem of
redistribution etc.), a self-reﬂective law has the potential to bring into
relief the politics involved in the depoliticising effects of juridiﬁcation.
A self-reﬂective enactment of law knows of the contingency of its own
construction of the non-law.
What would this mean in the context of the case discussed in this
chapter? The legal proceedings of Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador translate a
multidimensional conﬂict encompassing conﬂicts between different
modes of production, different ways of living, different ways of belonging
to law, different classes, subjects and regions into a legal language. Yet,
this process of framing is not reﬂected. Rather, the Hourani people are
presented as nature-related population that had always been there, the
78 In this vein, Buckel states that critical legal theory shows that the ambivalence of law to
simultaneously maintain existing power relations and protect against oppression is
characteristic of the form of law: Buckel in this volume.
79 See Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen, p. 87.
80 Menke in this volume. 81 See Menke, ‘Law and Violence’, p. 14.
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problem being the pollution, not the insertion of the rain forest into a
global capitalist economy. The legal documents produced in the context
of Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador testify to the tendency of the human rights
language to truncate the systematic analysis of the origin of conﬂict and
thereby also the way remedies are thought.82 While a strategic use of
human rights language can of course help to draw attention to certain
problems, not to reﬂect the limits that come with the very concepts of
human rights might perpetuate the very relations of power underlying
the conﬂict: economic and colonial.
A self-reﬂective enactment of law, then, would keep this multidimen-
sionality visible within law. Framing the conﬂict at hand as a legal conﬂict
between investor rights on the one hand and human and environmental
rights on the other, becomes but only one (contestable) translation of the
social conﬂict. Such a law can take into account that the ‘othering’ of the
affected as ‘afectados’ and ‘indigenas’ in tune with nature is a legal reduc-
tion of the underlying conﬂict under the auspices of a speciﬁc legality. The
question whether a certain group of ‘afectados’ has a legal claim against
Chevron for compensation for damages then is only one of many ques-
tions the law is confronted with while dealing with the claim.
The representation of the non-legal in and through law always remains
a legal construction. However, when law commits itself in its self-reﬂection
to constant irritation it makes its boundaries visible and thereby contest-
able. This way law can become a medium for the societal negotiation of
social conﬂicts, whose grammar is not predetermined. This would be a law
that would transform itself in the face of the social conﬂict as well as
transforming the social conﬂict.
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